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Energy is a central part of our daily life.Our heating
is done with electricity,gas,oil or some other form of
energy, all production processes depend on energy.
Our entire way of life is built on the abundant avail-
ability of affordable energy. After the vast destruc-
tions caused during the Word War II, energy policy
has been at the heart of European integration in the
early 1950s.The European Community for Coal and
Steel was the first of the three European
Communities to be set up. The European Atomic
Energy Community followed in 1957 together with
the European Economic Community at a time of
high expectations for nuclear energy. However, true
European energy policy in the framework of the
European Economic Community can only be dis-
cerned from the 1990s onwards even though most
instruments existed long before. In analysing
European energy policy in the early 1990s, Padgett
came to the conclusion that “there is a general agree-
ment that energy policy must be ranked as one of the
Community’s major failures” (Padgett 1992, 55).
Does this analysis still hold today?
The focus of energy policy in the European Union
today is threefold. First the completion of the inter-
nal market for energy,especially for gas and electric-
ity, lies at the centre of the third liberalisation pack-
age presented by the European Commission in
September 2007. The second pillar of the current
energy policy builds on the competence of the EU in
the field of environment. Here, the major legislative
package was the climate and energy package of 2008.
The third pillar concerns security of supply and has
come back into focus when the gas dispute between
Ukraine and Russia resulted in the closing down of
the Bratstvo Gas Pipeline, the main transit pipeline
for Russian gas to Central and Western Europe.
Only a month before the escalation of this dispute,
the Commission published several documents on
security of supply, inter alia the second strategic
energy review.
These three large packages cover to a large extent
the three main goals of energy policy: security of
supply, sustainability and competitiveness. These
goals must be treated equally at any time in order to
achieve a truly sustainable energy policy.This article
critically evaluates the most recent developments in
European energy policy and explores ways to con-
solidate the three basic objectives.
The internal market for energy
The establishment of a common market is the key
objective set out by Art. 2 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community. Art. 3c then follows the
lead by giving the European Community the assign-
ment to set up “an internal market characterised by
the abolition (...) of obstacles to the free movement
of goods,persons,services and capital”.Only later,in
the Treaty of Maastricht,Art.3u was added,inserting
the word “energy”. However, this insertion was
mainly meant as a clarification.Thus,the objective of
creating an internal market did also encompass the
market for energy – and the same is true for the
instruments set up by the Treaty, especially for Art.
28,29,30,82,86 and 100.Thus,as Grunwald,a former
member of the Commission rightly observes, “only
an explicit mandate for a common energy policy was
missing” (Grunwald 2003, 18).
Despite this often forgotten fact, the first concrete
measures were only adopted from 1988 onwards in
three important sectors. The first concerned price
transparency (European Council 1990), the second
the transit of energy through large networks
(European Council 1991) and the third access to
resources (European Parliament and European
Council). This first step, however, did prove insuffi-
cient to eliminate the many structural market barri-
ers that existed in the energy sectors of all Member * Member of the European Parliament.CESifo Forum 1/2009 51
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States. Roger Fauroux, the then French Minister for
Industry, summarised the situation in 1989 by
deploring that France was exporting electricity to
Switzerland, Italy and the United Kingdom, but not
to Germany – and this despite an export potential
worth around DM 2 billion and another twelve
nuclear power plants still under construction.1 This
explains why France was initially such an ardent sup-
porter of liberalisation. Today the situation has
changed profoundly.Not only is France often seen as
a chock block when it comes to liberalisation in the
energy market, it also exported an impressive 16 bil-
lion KW/h of electricity to Germany in 2005. The
root of this change was the liberalisation process on
European energy markets.
In 1992 the European Commission proposed two
parallel directives on common rules for the internal
market in electricity and gas (European Commission
1992a; European Commission 1992b). The central
topic of the discussions at the time was the issue of
grid access.As with railways,electricity and gas grids
represent natural monopolies. Thus non-discrimina-
tory access to the existing infrastructure is of central
importance for the development of competition. A
compromise was reached in 1996 and 1998, respec-
tively.Third party access (TPA) to the grids was to be
granted either on a negotiated or a regulated basis,
with the decision on which principle to adopt left to
each Member State. Moreover, several unbundling
provisions for vertically integrated companies were
set up in order to further increase transparency.
It soon became clear, however, that these provisions
were insufficient once again.A study carried out for
the European Commission found that markets
remained very much closed and that TPA had
remained problematic, especially in France and
Germany (DRI-WEFA 2001).Thus the Commission
presented two parallel acceleration directives in
2001 (European Commission 2001).The double pur-
pose of these directives was to open markets to full
competition and to harmonise national regulation.
Both directives were adopted in 2003.
As a principle, the acceleration directives provided
for a regulated TPA to the grid of transmission sys-
tem operators (TSO). Distribution system operators
(DSO) remained outside of the scope of the direc-
tives. Furthermore, for gas storage negotiated access
was still allowed.Exemptions could further be grant-
ed for major new investments such as interconnec-
tors between Member States, liquefied natural gas
(LNG) facilities or gas storage sites.TSOs were fur-
ther to be granted access to the grids of TSOs by
Member States. One of the most important steps,
however,was the creation of independent regulatory
bodies in all Member States. Furthermore, trans-
parency was to be increased by more rigorous
unbundling provisions that encompassed legal,oper-
ational and informational unbundling.
These complex provisions took several years to be
transposed into national law. In Germany, for exam-
ple, the directives were only transposed in 2005, and
thus in the same year in which the Commission start-
ed a further inquiry into the energy markets. The
Commission’s finding of continued market concen-
tration was therefore hardly surprising. Marietje
Nauschütz already warned in 2005 that the
Commission would not be satisfied with the acceler-
ation directives and could go even further by
demanding full ownership unbundling of vertically
integrated companies (Nauschütz 2005,292).Indeed,
ownership unbundling was by far the most important
and controversial topic of the third liberalisation
package that is to be adopted in the summer of 2009.
Already, the impact assessment presented by the
European Commission raised more questions than
answers. Despite the many open questions and the
fact that nobody could possibly expect liberalisation
to come into effect within a few years, negotiations
have continued.
In its first reading, the European Parliament opted for
different approaches for gas, for which the so-called
third option was introduced into the proposal,and elec-
tricity, for which the two Commission alternatives, full
ownership unbundling and Independent System
Operator were not complemented.The situation in the
Council was different, however: a blocking minority
around France and Germany was able to insert a third
option for both sectors.This very detailed third option,
the efficient unbundling of transmission system opera-
tors,foresaw very strict unbundling provisions stopping
short of ownership unbundling in order to ensure the
independence of the grid operators. The outcome of
the negotiations remains to be seen.All relevant actors
are united in their commitment to reach a compromise
by April 2009 at the latest in order to adopt the act
before the next European elections.
The main purpose, it is worth recalling, of the entire
third liberalisation package is to foster competition 1 See Frankfurter Allemeine Zeitung of 20 May 1989.CESifo Forum 1/2009 52
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and through competition to lower energy prices for
consumers.This purpose was entirely lost sight in the
course of the negotiations. In the German gas mar-
ket, for example, only 4.4 percent of the final price
for consumers is due to fees paid to TSOs for grid
access. Half the costs cover the purchase of gas itself
and nearly another 25 percent are accounted by
taxes.About 20 percent cover the costs of the distri-
bution system operators (DSO) themselves.The fig-
ures for electricity are similar.
Thus, the argument of the Commission that by
strengthening competition prices would automati-
cally come down, must be questioned. No data can
be found which clearly shows a correlation between
ownership unbundling and lower energy prices.
Furthermore, the Commission itself announced in a
staff working document that “the objective of own-
ership unbundling is not necessarily to bring prices
down but to achieve a price setting which reflects the
real cost of efficient operation and which gives the
right signals for the future investments needs, for
example in renewable energy” (European
Commission 2007, 37).
This seems to be the most honest statement on the
true objectives pursued by the Commission.What is
more,security of supply,even though it is mentioned
in the justification of the directives, never played a
role in the debate. The impact of full ownership
unbundling on security of supply is still unclear, but
the first experiences in Britain suggest that negative
effects of liberalisation might also exist. Gas storage
capacity in that country is one of the lowest in the
EU, for example.
From this experience with the liberalisation trilogy
the following can be deduced. First, we should accept
the fact that changes to structures that have grown
over decades cannot be made within a few years.
Second,we have to realise that the Commission,once
it has been given an incentive to regulate, will never
stop to pursue even further goals at ever shorter inter-
vals.And third, the European Parliament must finally
stand up to its role as legislator and subject
Commission proposals to in-depth scrutiny.
Environmental policy and its impact on 
energy policy
With the Single European Act (SEA) new compe-
tencies on environmental policy were introduced
into the EC Treaty. While Member States had often
used environmental policies to set up national barri-
ers to free trade and thus to safeguard their own
markets against foreign competition, the first har-
monisation measures at Community level were, as
Klaus Eckrich rightly points out, “rather aimed at
restoring free trade – and not necessarily to safe-
guard the environment” (Eckrich 1994, 5).
The central modification that led to a surge in envi-
ronmental legislation came only with the Treaty of
Amsterdam, in which the co-decision procedure was
extended to the field of environment. However, a
few exceptions remain even today,e.g.for provisions
primarily of a fiscal nature and measures significant-
ly affecting a Member State’s choice between differ-
ent sources and the general structure of its energy
supply.
Thus it was surprising that the Commission based its
legislative proposals within the climate and energy
package on Art. 175 I EC but not on Art. 175 II EC.
Defining specific targets for renewable energies, for
example, clearly affects the choice between different
sources and the general structure of the energy supply
of the Member States.At the same time, the proposal
altered the existing emissions trading system (ETS) of
the EU in such a way that it arguably imposes a tax on
CO2 emissions.Here again,European Parliament and
European Council failed to apply the necessary
scrutiny.As it turned out during the negotiations,only
the least controversial part of the package, the one
setting up common rules for carbon capture and stor-
age (CCS) for the demonstration plants, would clear-
ly fall under Art. 175 I EC.
Given the complexity of the matter and limited
space, only the ETS will be dealt with in more
detail here. The proposals were to serve a three-
fold aim: to reduce emissions by 20 percent, to
help improve energy efficiency by 20 percent and
to raise the share of renewable energies to 20 per-
cent by the year 2020.With the ETS, a price tag is
introduced for carbon emissions. Thus the main
idea is that the worst polluters should pay the
highest prices. The Commission proposal draws a
distinction between electricity generation and
CO2 intensive industries. Electricity generators
were to be subjected to full auctioning from 2013
onwards. Industry, however, was to be given more
time to adjust through a phasing in – starting at
20 percent auctioning in 2013 and resulting in full
auctioning in 2020.CESifo Forum 1/2009 53
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However, the proposal does not in any way account
for the enormous differences in the energy mix of
the now 27 Member States.Poland,for example,gen-
erates close to 80 percent of its electricity using solid
fuels.France,on the other hand,uses close to 80 per-
cent CO2 free nuclear energy. As a result of this
approach,the largest French energy company,EdF,is
likely to make additional profits in the range of
50 billion euros between 2013 and 2020 compared to
German power producers,simply by selling its cheap
electricity on the German market – at market prices
determined by the oldest German coal power plant.
Thus, full auctioning in the power sector leads to
severe distortions of competition.
This example demonstrates once more how schizo-
phrenic current EU energy policy is. On the one
hand,liberalisation is supposed to foster competition
and thus to lower prices for consumers and, on the
other hand, EU environmental policy leads to mas-
sive price increases. The Institute of Energy
Economics at the University of Cologne came to the
conclusion that the Commission proposal on ETS
would lead to a 50 percent increase in electricity
prices in Germany by 2020.
From here it does not take much to calculate the
amount of purchasing power that will be quashed.
Much more difficult to calculate, however, are the
indirect costs caused by higher electricity prices.
Electricity is the fundamental basis of all production
processes. Thus, a sharp increase in prices will
inevitably lead to higher product prices.Transport and
industrial companies will try to pass their addition
costs on to the consumers.A real impact assessment,
taking into account those indirect costs, has never
been published. One central reason for this omission
was the enormous time pressure that bore on both
Parliament and Council. This self-imposed pressure
served those in the Commission, Parliament and the
Council who wanted the fundamental characteristics
of the Commission proposal to remain unchanged.A
large minority favoured a different approach that
would not have endangered the main political goals of
reducing emissions by 20 percent but would save con-
sumers across the EU billions of euros each year.
Their idea was to introduce a benchmark system that
would have rewarded the most efficient installations.
Hence, both electricity producers and the remaining
industry sectors covered by the directive would have
been issued free certificates up to an ambitious and
dynamic benchmark. Should the monitored installa-
tion fall short of the benchmark, the remaining cer-
tificates would have had to be purchased on the mar-
ket.In order to avoid windfall profits,unused certifi-
cates would have had to be returned. Such a system
would have given strong investment incentives while
minimising costs. Minimising costs it would, howev-
er, have reduced revenues for the Member States. It
is precisely this reasoning that unmasks the fiscal
nature of the Commission proposal. By increasing
the number of certificates to be purchased to
100 percent, the measure takes on the character of a
CO2 tax.
In order to speed up negotiations, Parliament even
agreed to a proper co-decision procedure. This was
done through a relatively recent invention: the tria-
logue. In a joint declaration on practical arrange-
ments for the co-decision procedure (European
Parliament, Council, Commission 2007), the institu-
tions agree to cooperate in good faith with a view to
reconciling their positions in order to reach a first
reading agreement whenever possible. The EP code
of conduct for negotiating codecision files (European
Parliament 2008) clearly states that the decision to
enter into trialogue must be politically justified, for
example, on grounds of the uncontroversial or tech-
nical nature of the proposal or because of an urgent
situation.Even though the file was surely to be qual-
ified as a political priority, it is questionable whether
the conditions set out by the code of conduct were
met in this case.
Neither was the file uncontroversial, as the large
number of amendments demonstrated, nor was it
merely of a technical nature. Only the European
Council was able to reach a compromise at the end
of December 2008. This compromise allowed many
exceptions to the general rules for different groups
of countries and industries and foresaw a phasing-in
for power producers in the new Member States.
This course of action resulted in Parliament being
able to negotiate about exceptions for hospitals
with the French Presidency but not about the main
controversies of the file. These were left to the
Heads of State. Parliament was thus only able to
accept or to reject the compromise reached by the
Presidency. After having struggled for more power
over many decades, the co-decision procedure was
unhinged by a trialogue procedure that so far not
even appears in the rules of procedure of
Parliament. This result is to be deplored, not only
for democratic reasons.CESifo Forum 1/2009 54
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The power of the European Commission is extreme-
ly large. Once it had suggested full auctioning, it was
hardly possible to introduce an alternative that
would have saved consumers around 70 billion euros
every year. Parliament should not light-heartedly
engage in trialogue procedures on highly controver-
sial files, as it will only lose power to the Council.A
proper first reading would further have enabled
Parliament to present the Council with a position
carried by the entire house – instead of entering into
negotiations with the position of just one
Committee. But ideology once more prevailed over
rationality when it came to environmental files.
Security of supply
The winter of 2008/2009 demonstrated again the
overwhelming importance of supply security.For the
fourth time already, a gas dispute between Russia
and Ukraine caused disruptions of gas supplies to
the EU. With 80 percent of Russian gas exports to
the West transiting Ukraine, the consequences of
blocking the pipeline were felt almost immediately
in many Member States. Bulgaria closed more than
50 schools due to gas shortages, Romania declared a
state of emergency, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary,
Germany and France reported sharp drops of supply,
as Russian gas could only be transported through
Belarus and demand was soaring due to tempera-
tures well below zero in most parts of Europe.
Only in November 2008 had the Commission present-
ed its Second Strategic Energy Review (European
Commission 2008). This communication focuses on
five major points: (1) infrastructure needs and the
diversification of energy supplies, (2) external energy
relations, (3) oil and gas stocks and crisis response
mechanisms, (4) energy efficiency and (5) making the
best use of indigenous sources of energy.
Despite gains in efficiency, energy demand and espe-
cially the demand for gas will increase in the future.
The share of gas in gross domestic consumption has
already increased from 17.9 percent in 1990 to
24.6 percent in 2005. Thereafter it is presumed to
increase to 25.7 percent in 2020.At the same time,the
share of solid fuels is predicted to decline further to
less than 17 percent in 2030. According to the
European Commission (2007b), declining indigenous
gas and oil production in the EU means that import
dependency will continue to rise, reaching 84 percent
for gas in 2030 (from 46 percent in 1990) and even
95 percent for oil (up from 80 percent in 1990).These
figures do not yet reflect the shift in primary energy
demand that will be caused by the ETS reform.
Diversification of transport routes is the traditional
answer that was already promoted by Winston
Churchill before World War I:“safety and certainty
in oil lie in variety and variety alone”. Therefore it
is of paramount importance to define priority infra-
structure projects and to actively promote their
realisation. Two of these priority projects that fig-
ure dominantly in the list of projects of European
interest within the framework of Trans European
Energy Networks (TEN-E), are the North Stream
Pipeline through the Baltic Sea and the Nabucco
pipeline linking the Caspian Sea to South Eastern
Europe (European Parliament and European
Council 2006).
It is unclear how such projects can successfully be
promoted by the EU with a budget of just 25 million
euros a year for TEN-E priority projects that not
only cover gas but also electricity. Even though it is
evident that those multi-billion euro investments
have to be accomplished by private investors,at least
the political support must be strong. But even this
support is lacking.
The North Stream Pipeline with a total length of
close to 1200 kms will cost over 7.4 billion euros
and was supposed to carry 24 to 27.5 billion m3 of
gas to the EU each year starting from 2010. The
doubling of the pipeline would then later have
allowed the import of up to 55 billion m3 of gas
each year. By comparison, Britain produced just 80
billion m3 of gas in 2006.The feasibility studies were
carried out from 1997 to 1999, thus ten years ago.
But still the pipeline does not exist. Mainly Poland
and the Baltic countries, but also Finland and
Sweden have at one point or the other in the
process slowed down negotiations due to security
concerns. Only now, with the renewed gas dispute,
the perception is finally changing.
A central part of the strategy of diversification will
also be the extension and upgrading of the “inter-
nal” pipeline system of the EU in order to allow
reverse flows. Furthermore, LNG facilities have to
be promoted even more vigorously in order to
diversify supply routes. Qatar is already preparing
itself for the surge in demand, for example, by
designing new LNG tankers of Q-Flex and Q-Max
size that are able to carry around 80 percent moreCESifo Forum 1/2009 55
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gas than current tankers which, in turn, will consid-
erably help reduce costs.
The stronger promotion of LNG will not fail to
affect gas markets.As in oil markets,new traders will
emerge, spot markets are likely to appear and thus
the hitherto regional gas markets around the world
will at least in part develop into global markets.This
will have consequences for future gas flows.Whereas
the EU is currently geographically well located to
import gas through pipelines that take years or
decades to amortise and thus guarantee supply over
long periods of time, tying both parties together,
LNG offers more flexibility for both suppliers and
buyers. As this is a new situation that Europe will
have to face in coming decades, we need clear and
open discussions and, even more importantly, deci-
sions in order to prepare ourselves.
The EU will not start building pipelines or LNG
facilities itself and will not act as a contract partner
of foreign oil or gas companies.However,it can help.
For example, through the INOGATE programme
the EU conducted many studies on the existing ener-
gy infrastructure in Central Asia. It has further
helped to train personnel and to finance gas meter-
ing stations that were able to enhance mutual confi-
dence in those states.
Nonetheless, the vital question of the status of the
Caspian Sea has yet to be resolved. The EU could
have acted as a mediator in the conflict or at least
put pressure on the parties to find a compromise.
Until today this conflict has prevented the construc-
tion of a pipeline through the Caspian Sea for over a
decade.Instead of exporting gas from Turkmenistan,
which holds the second largest gas reserves in the
CIS after Russia, towards the West, pipelines are
now being planned to run eastwards to China.
Turkmen gas, however, would have been of central
importance to fill the Nabucco pipeline. Thus the
hesitant attitude of the EU now endangers one of its
top priority projects.
Not only supply routes but also a wide energy mix is
of vital importance for securing energy supply. Such
an energy mix must include safe nuclear energy as
well as coal, since both provide not only cheap ener-
gy,but these primary sources of energy are imported
from stable export countries and at relatively stable
prices. Indeed, coal prices have seen the largest sta-
bility over decades compared to oil and gas prices.
Furthermore, even as uranium prices have seen a
considerable increase in recent years, price effects
remain minimal since fuel prices only account for a
small fraction of the operating costs of nuclear
power plants.
Renewable energies were most strongly promoted in
past decades. The decision to raise the share of
renewable energies to 20 percent will lead to further
improvement of energy security. However, the main
problem with renewable energies consists in the effi-
cient allocation of subsidies. It does not make much
sense to pay the highest subsidies to solar energy in
Germany, when solar panels operate much more
efficiently in Southern Europe. The directive on
renewable energies, which was just adopted last
December, did nothing to improve such inefficien-
cies, despite the imminent financial crisis. On the
contrary,it protected national systems,most of which
are based on national guaranteed feed-in tariffs.This
inefficiency only raises costs for all consumers and
might also reduce the acceptance of renewable ener-
gies if costs become too high.
Energy efficiency is yet another topic in the context
of security of supply. The Spring 2007 European
Council decided to raise overall energy efficiency
within the EU by 20 percent by 2020 (European
Council 2007). Ever since, the Commission has pre-
sented a whole bunch of proposals on how to attain
this target, including the ban of the old light bulb.
More bans and further regulation, for example on
energy use during stand- by and on energy related
products, will soon follow.
It is doubtful, however, whether regulation is indeed
the best way to foster efficiency. Car manufacturers
would have stepped up their development of low
consumption engines and flexy-fuel or hybrid cars
even without the penalties that have also been decid-
ed last December.The main driver for innovation in
this respect was soaring oil prices that led to a
change in consumer demand around the world, not
the prospect of penalties.
What lessons may be learnt from the past? First of
all,security of supply has to be taken seriously both
in the internal and the external policies of the
European Union.There is no need to discuss ener-
gy efficiency and sustainability when no energy can
be produced in the first place. The most recent gas
dispute showed clearly once more that concrete
actions have finally to be taken. Second, we must
find a way to allocate our capital much more effi-CESifo Forum 1/2009 56
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ciently in order to ensure a broad energy mix.And
third, even though energy efficiency is of central
importance to reduce growth in demand, we have
to rethink the mechanisms that will ultimately
achieve the goal.
Quo vadis?
Energy policy has gained considerable importance
over the last two decades.This is due in part to a shift
towards greater liberalisation of energy markets in
the United States and in Britain in the 1980s,but also
to technological developments and to the break-up
of the Soviet Union and the enlargement process of
the EU itself.
Our world is changing constantly. But one fact
remains true for the past centuries if not even mil-
lennia: we do need energy.And our need for energy
has been growing at an alarming pace ever since the
invention of the steam engine and the industrial rev-
olution. Furthermore, the earth’s population has
risen rapidly in the last 150 years and the United
Nations predict a further rise in the next decades.At
the same time, countries like China and India are
witnessing their own industrial revolutions as they
enter a new era. Each one of these developments
further increases global demand for energy.
Therefore, energy policy cannot be successful if it is
short-sighted.If we want to retain our way of life and
to continue being at the forefront of science and pro-
duction, then we must by all means develop a sus-
tainable energy policy that balances security of sup-
ply, sustainability and competitiveness. The EU is
moving along a good path but it will be necessary to
avoid contradictions like those we have witnessed in
recent years. Maybe the restructuring of the
European Commission currently under discussion
will help develop a more consistent European ener-
gy policy in the future.
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